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经济学 1979

前景理论:风险下决策的分析

丹尼尔·卡尼曼 与 阿莫斯·特沃斯基

一笔损失之痛,约是等量获得之乐的两倍——我们按「变化」、而非最终财富来选择。

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In depth · the introduction

给你一笔稳拿的 $3,000,或是 80% 的机会拿到 $4,000,多数人会抓住那笔稳拿的——可一旦同样的数字变成损失,他们又掉头去赌。两位心理学家,把这个怪癖变成了一套理论。

核心想法

古典经济学假定,人们按最终财富来权衡选择,挑那个平均回报最高的。丹尼尔·卡尼曼与阿莫斯·特沃斯基却表明,头脑并非如此运作。我们评判一个结果,不是拿它去比自己的银行存款总额,而是把它看作相对于此刻所站之处——一个参照点——的「获得」或「损失」。而且我们对二者并不一视同仁:一笔损失之痛,大约是同等获得之乐的两倍。

正是这一不对称——损失厌恶——加上「我们对一笔变化的第一块钱,感受比第一千块更强烈」这一事实,以可预测的方式扭弯了我们的选择。我们会求稳,以锁定一笔获得;却会冒险,以逃开一笔确定的损失。我们还会对极小的概率反应过度——这正是为什么同一个人,能在同一周里既买彩票、又买保险。

它是如何诞生的

卡尼曼与特沃斯基是以色列的心理学家,1969 年起在耶路撒冷的希伯来大学开始合作,成了科学史上最著名的搭档之一——两人如此对等,以至于有时靠掷硬币来决定谁的名字排在前面。整个 1970 年代,他们做着一些看似简单的问卷:你更想要这个赌局,还是那个?而答案,一次次地击穿了当时主流的理性选择理论。

1979 年,他们在《计量经济学》上摆出了这一规律——特意发表在一份经济学期刊上,以触达他们意图改变的那个领域。特沃斯基于 1996 年去世;卡尼曼获得了 2002 年的诺贝尔经济学纪念奖,而他此后一生都说,这个奖属于他们两人。

它为何重要

它撬开了「完全理性的经济人」这一假设,开创了行为经济学。一旦你接受人们会以系统、可预测的方式误判风险,你就能解释旧模型解释不了的行为——市场为何恐慌,我们为何死抱亏损的投资,一个选择的措辞为何会改变我们的取舍——并据此围绕「人们实际如何决策」,设计出更好的默认选项、警示与政策。

一个可以想象的画面

想象一支衡量金钱的温度计,它的零点不设在绝对零度,而设在室温——也就是你此刻所在之处。一切都被读作比「现在」更「暖」(获得)或更「冷」(损失),而从不是一个绝对的数字。而且刻度盘上「冷」的那半边被拉长了:掉十度的难受,远胜过升十度的舒服。挪动你的参照点——比方说,习惯了更高的薪水——整条刻度便随你滑动,于是昨日的奢侈,成了今天的寻常。

一条 S 形的「价值」曲线穿过一个中心点:获得在右侧缓缓上升,损失在左侧陡然下落。滑块设定赌注多大、获胜机会多少;一个「获得/损失」开关翻转整个情境。工具会告诉你:前景理论预测你会选稳拿还是去赌——而当你切到损失时,预测就翻了过来。

它的位置

两个世纪以来,经济学运转在期望效用之上——这一来自丹尼尔·伯努利、后由约翰·冯·诺伊曼发扬的想法认为,人们最大化的是最终财富的平均效用;本馆的纳什(1950)与马科维茨(1952)正建立在它之上。前景理论是经验上的反驳:一份对「真实选择如何偏离那个理想」的细致测绘,秉持着赫伯特·西蒙「有限理性」的精神。从这里,一条路径直通向理查德·塞勒的「助推」,通向今天的行为公共政策。

The original document
Original source text
D. Kahneman & A. Tversky · Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–291
A choice between gambles
Decision making under risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects or gambles. A prospect (x₁, p₁; …; xₙ, pₙ) is a contract that yields outcome xᵢ with probability pᵢ.
The paper opens by treating expected utility theory not as a description of how people choose but as a hypothesis to be tested — and then tests it with a series of simple two-option "problems" put to respondents, whose near-unanimous answers repeatedly violate the theory's axioms.
The certainty effect
[P]eople overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable — a phenomenon which we label the certainty effect.
Asked to choose between a sure 3,000 and an 80% chance of 4,000 (which is worth 3,200 on average), most people take the sure thing — and this preference for certainty, demonstrated in variants of Maurice Allais's 1953 paradox, cannot be reconciled with the independence axiom of expected utility.
The reflection effect
When the sign of every outcome is reversed, preferences reverse with it. Offered an 80% chance of 4,000 against a certain 3,000, 80% of respondents chose the sure gain; mirror the same problem into losses — an 80% chance of losing 4,000 against a certain loss of 3,000 — and 92% now chose the gamble. People are risk-averse over gains but risk-seeking over losses.
Value is defined on changes, not on final wealth
[T]he value function is (i) defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii) generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than for gains.
Probabilities, in turn, enter not directly but through decision weights π(p) that overweight small probabilities and are subadditive — the device that lets the same person buy both lottery tickets and insurance.
[ … ]
The paper distinguishes an early editing phase, in which prospects are simplified and coded as gains and losses, from a later evaluation phase that applies V = Σ π(pᵢ) v(xᵢ); it documents the isolation and framing effects, restricts itself to simple prospects, and sketches extensions. The full article is available at the source below.
Econometrica · March 1979