经济学 1937

企业的性质

罗纳德·科斯

市场既能协调一切，企业为何还存在？因为用市场，本身就有成本。

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In depth · the introduction

如果市场如此擅长协调「谁该生产什么」，那为什么还会有人费心去开一家公司呢？

核心想法

经济学长久以来教导我们：价格悄悄地组织起了一切。没有谁在规划整个经济，可面包照样有人烤、鞋子照样有人做，因为价格在轻轻地推着人们走向「被需要之处」。但科斯注意到一桩怪事。在一家公司内部，做主的并不是价格——而是老板。一名员工换岗位，不是因为工资变了，而是因为有人吩咐她换。公司，就像市场汪洋之中一座座小小的「计划」孤岛。

那么，这些孤岛为何存在？因为使用市场，本身并不免费。你每一次选择去「买」、而不是自己「做」，都得去找供应商、谈妥价格、签下合约、再验收成果——这一切都要耗费时间与精力。科斯把它们称作「交易成本」。只要「把一项活动纳入内部、直接指挥」比「不断到公开市场上购买」更便宜，企业就会出现。

它是如何诞生的

这个想法成形时，科斯不过二十出头，是一位 1931 至 1932 年间在美国游历的英国学生。他走访了一家家工厂与企业，反复向经理们提一个简单的问题：你为什么自己造这个零件，而不是买来用？为什么这家公司是这个规模，不更大也不更小？教科书对此并没有真正的答案。

他把答案写成一篇论文，于 1937 年发表在《经济学刊》(Economica) 上。文章清晰，近乎娓娓道来，可在此后数十年间，却基本无人问津。科斯后来说，它「被广泛引用，却鲜被使用」。直到其他经济学家拾起「交易成本」这件工具，它的分量才显露出来；它成了整个经济学中被引用最多的论文之一，并在他写下它半个多世纪之后，助他赢得了 1991 年的诺贝尔奖。

它为何重要

在科斯之前，企业像一个黑箱，经济学只是把它当作既定的前提。是他，把企业变成了一件可以解释、甚至可以预测的事物：企业靠「吞下那些它能比市场更便宜地组织起来的交易」而成长，又在「内部多做一件事的成本已高过直接购买」之时停止成长。「权衡自己做的成本与使用市场的成本」——这一个想法，如今就藏在每一家企业关于「造什么、外包什么、做到多大」的每一个决策背后。

一个可以想象的画面

想想吃饭这件事。你可以把每一餐都买成现成的菜——方便，但你得付餐馆的加价，每次还要挑选、点单、等待。你也可以在家做饭：每餐更便宜，可你得采买、计划、洗碗。大多数家庭两样都来一点，在「在家做已经不值那份麻烦」之处划下一条线。企业划的，正是这样一条线，只不过划的是生产：凡自己组织更便宜的，它就自己做；其余的，到市场上买。科斯的洞见在于：这条线，恰恰落在两种成本相交之处。

它的位置

两个世纪之前，亚当·斯密曾惊叹于：市场竟能在无人统筹的情况下，协调起整个经济（参见本馆收录的他的《国富论》）。科斯接着追问了斯密悬而未答的下一个问题：市场既是如此出色的协调者，那为什么还会有企业——那些把市场「关掉」、改由老板来拍板的角落？他的回答，开创了经济学的一整个分支。后来的思想者——奥利弗·威廉姆森，以及哈特和他的同事们——则建起了「何时自制、何时外购」的精细理论。今天每一场关于外包、零工平台、以及「科技巨头该有多大」的争论，归根结底，都是一场从这里开始的对话。

The original document

Original source text

R. H. Coase · Economica, New Series, 4 (16), Nov. 1937: 386–405 · London School of Economics

Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. … It is hoped to show … that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.

As D. H. Robertson points out, we find

islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.

Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production.

It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.

[ … ]

The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organising” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. … The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.

First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organising additional transactions within the firm may rise. Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market, or, to the costs of organising by another entrepreneur.

a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organising an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organising in another firm.

R. H. Coase · Economica · November 1937