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经济学 1951

《社会选择与个人价值》

肯尼思·阿罗

他证明没有任何投票规则能做到完全公平——并由此开创了社会选择理论。

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In depth · the introduction

随便找一群人,给他们三个选项,多数人的意愿就可能咬住自己的尾巴打转——A 胜过 B,B 胜过 C,可 C 又胜过 A。

核心想法

我们总愿意相信:只要大家投票,群体真实的偏好自然会浮现。肯尼思·阿罗却证明,这份指望本身有一道裂缝。只要选项不少于三个,就没有任何投票规则能同时满足几条显然合理的公平要求——这不是因为我们还没想出那条聪明的规则,而是因为这样的规则根本不可能存在。

那几条要求都很温和:如果所有人都偏好 A 胜过 B,群体也该如此;不该有某个人暗中独断结果;而群体在 A 与 B 之间的取舍,不该仅仅因为另一个不相干的选项 C 进入或退出竞选就翻盘。阿罗证明,你无法同时拥有这一切。总得有什么要让步。

它是如何诞生的

阿罗当时是个年轻的经济学家——还不到三十岁——在芝加哥的考尔斯委员会写博士论文,同时在兰德公司做顾问;在那里,冷战时代「一个国家如何『偏好』任何事物」的难题,逼着他认真思考如何把一个个意志合并起来。他一次次试图设计出公平的规则,又一次次以同样的方式失败。

这些失败并不新鲜。早在 1780 年代的法国大革命时期,孔多塞侯爵就已注意到,多数投票会绕圈。阿罗的飞跃,是不再追猎那条完美的规则,转而像几何学家那样,证明完美的规则根本不可能。他于 1950 年发表论证,1951 年出版了完整的专著《社会选择与个人价值》。1972 年,它为他带来诺贝尔奖。

它为何重要

阿罗把一桩含糊的隐忧——「投票好像很乱」——变成了一条关于世界的、锐利而永久的事实,其分量不亚于证明「化圆为方」之不可能。它重塑了经济学与政治理论:自此,问题不再是「哪条规则才公平」,而是「我们能忍受哪一种不完美」。每一个设计选举、委员会流程或排序算法的人,都是在阿罗那些躲不掉的取舍之间做选择。

一个可以想象的画面

想想石头剪刀布。石头赢剪刀,剪刀赢布,布又赢石头——没有总冠军,只有一个循环。现在把这三位玩家想成候选人,把「赢」想成多数投票。阿罗的发现是:这个循环并非某个无聊游戏的怪癖;对任何一种诚实、不偏不倚的投票规则,总会有某一组人的偏好把它掰成正是这样一个圈,让你没有任何公平的办法去加冕胜者。

可交互的投票图:三名选民各自对候选人 A、B、C 排序;点一下某位选民即可改变其排序。箭头显示每场一对一多数对决谁胜出;有时某个候选人同时胜过另外两人,有时箭头却绕成一圈,根本没有胜者。

它的位置

一个半世纪以前,孔多塞与波达已经察觉投票会出岔子;阿罗则给他们的悖论安了一个统一的、演绎的家。这部著作与同一时刻约翰·纳什的博弈论(1950)并肩而立——两者都把策略与选择的数学带进了经济学——并垫在此后每一项关于投票、公平分配与市场设计的结果之下。正因如此,当公民们盼望「人民的意志」时,经济学家谈的却是「取舍」。

The original document
Original source text
Kenneth J. Arrow · “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare” · Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 328–346
This paper, and the short monograph Social Choice and Individual Values that grew from it the next year, ask one question: can a society combine the preferences of its members into a single coherent ranking, by any fair rule at all?
Two ways a society chooses
The companion book opens by setting the stage:
In a capitalist democracy there are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used to make 'political' decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make 'economic' decisions.
A few reasonable conditions
Arrow asks for a rule that turns the individuals' rankings into one social ranking and obeys conditions almost no one would refuse: it must return a verdict for any preferences at all; if everyone prefers one option to another, so must society; the social choice between two options must depend only on how people rank those two; and no single person may be a dictator whose preference always prevails. (The 1951 edition listed five such conditions, including monotonicity and non-imposition; the 1963 edition reduced them to these.)
The voting paradox
The trouble is visible in the oldest example. Let one voter rank A above B above C; a second rank B above C above A; a third rank C above A above B. Then a majority prefers A to B, and a majority prefers B to C — yet a majority prefers C to A. The group's 'preference' is a circle with no top. Majority rule has just broken transitivity.
The impossibility
Arrow proves that the circle cannot be patched away: for three or more alternatives, any rule meeting his conditions must break one of them. The paper states the verdict plainly:
If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial.
[ … ]
Kenneth J. Arrow · Journal of Political Economy · 1950