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經濟學 1944

賽局理論與經濟行為

約翰·馮·紐曼 與 奧斯卡·摩根斯特恩

把衝突與風險下的理性抉擇,化為數學。

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In depth · the introduction

當你的最佳一步,取決於別人即將怎麼走,尋常的數學便捉襟見肘了——於是兩位思想家發明了「彼此揣度」的數學,以及當結局是一場賭博時、如何明智抉擇的數學。

核心想法

在那之前,經濟學大多設想的是一個孤身一人、面對固定價格的個體,就像在一家商店裡購物,你做什麼都改變不了價籤。可現實中,處處都是「對你最好的做法,取決於別人怎麼選」的情形——討價還價、競價投標、爭搶顧客,甚至打牌時的虛張聲勢。馮·紐曼與摩根斯特恩主張,這些其實都是同一類問題:一場策略賽局。而且他們證明,這件事可以用嚴謹的數學來做,而非僅靠空泛的推斷。

他們的第一個結論,頗為驚人。在一場嚴格競爭的二人賽局裡——一方所贏,恰是另一方所輸——只要你肯把自己的招數隨機地混著出、讓人看不透,那麼,總存在一種可被證明為最佳的玩法。他們的第二個結論,則對付風險:他們造出了一種乾淨的辦法,把你在「安全的賭注」與「賭博」之間的直覺偏好,化為實實在在的數字——一把私人的「效用」標尺——於是,理性的選擇,無非就是那個期望效用最高的選項。

它是如何誕生的

約翰·馮·紐曼是那個世紀最偉大的數學家之一,一位神童,從量子力學到最早的電腦、再到原子彈,無所不涉。年輕時的 1928 年,他便證明了一條關於二人賽局的定理。奧斯卡·摩根斯特恩則是一位流亡到普林斯頓的奧地利經濟學家,他深信經濟學需要更牢固的數學根基,並為此一再進言。

二人在普林斯頓相遇,開始了一場遠超彼此預想的合作——原本計劃的一本小冊子,膨脹成了一部 625 頁的大書。它於 1944 年、第二次世界大戰正酣之際出版,創立了一整門學科。出於誠實,須就功勞補上一筆:其中艱深的數學,壓倒性地出自馮·紐曼之手;而摩根斯特恩的天賦,在於看見、並鍥而不捨地論證——這些工具,本就屬於經濟學的核心。

它為何重要

在這本書之前,經濟學家沒有嚴謹的辦法,去刻畫「彼此揣度的人」。在它之後,「賽局理論」成了一門橫跨經濟學、政治學、生物學與電腦科學的通用語言。同樣重要的是,效用的想法,給了「風險厭惡」一個精確的含義——為什麼穩拿的 40 美元,會比擲硬幣博取 100 美元更讓人安心——它坐落於保險如何定價、投資如何權衡的底層。後來的思想家也發現了這套理論的邊界,而正是那些邊界,催生了行為經濟學這門領域。

一個可以想像的畫面

想想剪刀石頭布。如果你總出石頭,一個機靈的對手就會總出布,每一局都贏你。唯一立於不敗之地的方案,是隨機化——三分之一出石頭、三分之一出布、三分之一出剪刀——這樣沒人能預測你。馮·紐曼的極小極大定理說,每一場嚴格競爭的賽局,都恰有這樣一種最佳的、不可預測的策略。而對於有風險的選擇,效用曲線就像飢餓程度的差別:第一塊披薩讓你大快朵頤,第八塊卻幾乎無感——於是一頓穩穩到手的飯,對你可能比博取一場盛宴更值錢。

一個可互動的決策面板:左側是金錢效用曲線,右側是與穩拿 40 美元相對的彩票轉盤。滑動賭局的中獎機會與一個「謹慎」滑桿,面板便會告訴你:是去賭、還是守住穩拿的錢,以及這場賭局對你值多少保底的金額。

它的位置

在亞當·斯密描繪出一個由獨立交易者組成、被「看不見的手」引導的經濟之後一個半世紀,這本書補上了那塊缺失的拼圖:當人們不只是對價格作出反應、而是主動彼此算計時,會發生什麼。這條線索,繼續穿過約翰·納許——他 1950 年的均衡,把這個想法推廣到了並非嚴格「你輸我贏」的賽局——一直延伸到今天的拍賣設計師,以及那種讓兩個神經網路彼此對抗的「對抗式」訓練。它也開啟了一個後來被行為經濟學攪得複雜起來的故事——人們發現,真實的人,並不總是服從期望效用那套整潔的邏輯。

The original document
Original source text

綱領——為經濟學而用的數學

John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern · Theory of Games and Economic Behavior · 1944 · Ch. 1, §1.2
It is not that there exists any fundamental reason why mathematics should not be used in economics. The arguments often heard that because of the human element, of the psychological factors etc., or because there is — allegedly — no measurement of important factors, mathematics will find no application, can all be dismissed as utterly mistaken.
The reason why mathematics has not been more successful in economics must, consequently, be found elsewhere. … The lack of real success is largely due to a combination of unfavorable circumstances, some of which can be removed gradually. To begin with, the economic problems were not formulated clearly and are often stated in such vague terms as to make mathematical treatment a priori appear hopeless because it is quite uncertain what the problems really are.

經濟為何是一場策略賽局

Ch. 1, §1.1 — Formulation of the Economic Problem
We hope to establish satisfactorily, after developing a few plausible schematizations, that the typical problems of economic behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable games of strategy.
It will be seen, however, that this theory of games of strategy is the proper instrument with which to develop a theory of economic behavior. One would misunderstand the intent of our discussions by interpreting them as merely pointing out an analogy between these two spheres. We hope to establish satisfactorily … that the typical problems of economic behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable games of strategy.

用賭局來度量效用(§3.3)

Ch. 1, §3.3 — The Notion of Utility
Let us for the moment accept the picture of an individual whose system of preferences is all-embracing and complete, i.e. who, for any two objects or rather for any two imagined events, possesses a clear intuition of preference.
If he now prefers A to the 50-50 combination of B and C, this provides a plausible base for the numerical estimate that his preference of A over B is in excess of his preference of C over A.
[ … ]
It is well known that thereby utilities — or rather differences of utilities — become numerically measurable. … We have practically defined a numerical scale for the quantity which we used to call ‘utility.’

署於何地、何時

The two authors — a Hungarian-born mathematician at the Institute for Advanced Study and an Austrian economist at Princeton — finished the preface to the first edition together.
Princeton, N. J. · January 1943