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Economics 1950

Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games

John F. Nash, Jr.

In any game, there is always a way to play where no one can gain by changing strategy alone.

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In depth · the introduction

A game can always settle into a standoff where no player, looking only at their own gain, has any reason to move — even when everyone would be better off somewhere else.

The big idea

Most situations that matter — businesses setting prices, countries negotiating, drivers choosing routes — are games: what's best for you depends on what everyone else does. John Nash asked a simple question about such games: is there always a stable resting point? He proved there is. It's now called a Nash equilibrium — a combination of choices where no single player can do better by changing their own choice while everyone else keeps theirs.

The catch is that "stable" doesn't mean "good for all". In the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, two suspects are each better off betraying the other no matter what — so both betray, and both end up worse off than if they had stayed silent. That outcome is the equilibrium: not because it's best, but because neither can improve their own lot alone.

How it came about

Game theory had a towering founder — John von Neumann, who with the economist Oskar Morgenstern wrote its 1944 bible. But their sharpest results were for two-person zero-sum games, where one player's gain is exactly the other's loss. Most real conflicts aren't like that. In 1949, a 21-year-old Princeton graduate student named John Nash defined an equilibrium that worked for any number of players with any mixture of cooperation and conflict, and proved that one always exists.

His announcement ran barely a page in 1950, with the full thesis paper following in 1951. Recognition came slowly: Nash's career was interrupted for decades by schizophrenia, the story later told in the film A Beautiful Mind. In 1994 he shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for this work.

Why it mattered

It gave economics and the social sciences a single, general tool for predicting outcomes when people's interests partly clash and partly align — which is almost always. Before Nash, the theory mostly handled pure duels. After him, the same idea could be aimed at markets, auctions, arms races, evolution and traffic — anywhere independent decision-makers shape one another's best move.

A way to picture it

Think of choosing a checkout line at a busy supermarket. Once the lines have balanced out, no single shopper can switch to another line and get through faster — if anyone could, they would already have moved. That balanced arrangement, where no one can improve by switching alone, is an equilibrium. It isn't necessarily the fastest possible for everybody; it's just the point where each person, acting only for themselves, has run out of reasons to move.

Interactive game matrix: choose Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt or Matching Pennies; each cell shows both players' pay-offs with best replies underlined, and cells that are mutual best replies are ringed as Nash equilibria; click a cell to read whether either player could gain by switching alone.

Where it sits

Adam Smith's "invisible hand" (1776) imagined self-interest adding up to collective good; the Prisoner's Dilemma is the sharp reminder that it doesn't always — self-interest can lock everyone into a worse outcome. Nash's equilibrium is the precise language for both. Its logic later reappeared in biology, where John Maynard Smith recast it as the evolutionarily stable strategy, and in computing, where today's AI systems are often trained as games played to equilibrium.

The original document
Original source text
J. F. Nash, Jr. · Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950): 48–49 · communicated by S. Lefschetz, Nov. 16, 1949
One may define a concept of an n-person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n-tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms in the probabilities with which the various players play their various pure strategies.
Any n-tuple of strategies, one for each player, may be regarded as a point in the product space obtained by multiplying the n strategy spaces of the players. One such n-tuple counters another if the strategy of each player in the countering n-tuple yields the highest obtainable expectation for its player against the n − 1 strategies of the other players in the countered n-tuple.
A self-countering n-tuple is called an equilibrium point.
[ … ]
By using the continuity of the pay-off functions we see that the graph of the mapping is closed. Since the graph is closed and since the image of each point under the mapping is convex, we infer from Kakutani's theorem that the mapping has a fixed point (i.e., point contained in its image).
[ … ]
The author is indebted to Dr. David Gale for suggesting the use of Kakutani's theorem to simplify the proof and to the A. E. C. for financial support.
Department of Mathematics, Princeton University · November 16, 1949