authentication
Before a bank teller lets you withdraw money, they must answer one question: are you really who you claim to be? They might check your ID card, or ask for a password and a code texted to your phone. Authentication is exactly that step in a computer: verifying that a user (or a program) genuinely is the identity it claims, before the system decides what that identity is allowed to do. It is the front door — everything else hinges on getting it right.
The classic framing is that you can prove identity by one of three kinds of evidence, called factors: something you know (a password, a PIN), something you have (a phone, a hardware security key, a smart card), and something you are (a fingerprint, a face, an iris — biometrics). Take passwords, the most common know factor: a system must never store the raw password, because a leaked database would then hand attackers every account. Instead it stores a hash — the output of a one-way function that is easy to compute forward but practically impossible to reverse — so it checks a login by hashing what you typed and comparing. To stop attackers from precomputing hashes of common passwords, each password is also given a unique random salt mixed in before hashing, so identical passwords hash differently and a single precomputed table cannot crack them all. Multi-factor authentication combines two or more different factors (say a password plus a phone code), so that stealing just one is not enough. Crucially, authentication is distinct from authorization: authentication asks who are you, authorization asks what may you do — you authenticate once, then the system checks your authorizations on each action.
Authentication matters because it is the foundation every other control rests on — access control, auditing, and accountability all assume the system correctly knows who is acting. The honest caveats are sharp. Passwords are weak in practice: people reuse them, pick guessable ones, and get phished, which is why multi-factor is strongly recommended. Biometrics feel magical but have a hard problem — you cannot change your fingerprint if it leaks, and they can be spoofed — so they are best as one factor, not the only one. And no authentication is stronger than its recovery path: a perfect login is worthless if account recovery can be social-engineered.
You log in with a password (know) and then approve a prompt on your phone (have) — two factors. The server never sees your stored password; it hashes what you typed with your account's salt and compares to the stored hash. Even if the password database leaks, attackers face salted hashes, not plaintext.
Two different factors, and only salted hashes ever stored.
Do not confuse authentication (proving who you are) with authorization (deciding what you may do). And remember biometrics are not unbreakable — a leaked fingerprint cannot be reissued like a password, so they are best used as one factor among several.